One of the pragmatic wisdoms is “Let us cross the bridge when we come to it”. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) tried to cross the bridge before reaching it. They did not envisage the possibility of a stalemate in their negotiations with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) due to the lack of recognition and differentiation between the military coup staged by them and an alignment of the armed forces with them to change the regime. In a planned and staged coup they can achieve their goals in one package. This happened two times before. In May 1969 a planned leftist coup was successfully staged in which the leftists achieve their goals of implanting all their ideological policies as one package namely civil service cleansing, confiscation and nationalization of private sector companies. In 1989 the Islamists staged a coup in which they implemented their ideological agenda in one package at the onset of the success of the coup e.g. purging the civil service from all non-affiliated persons to the Islamic Movement, empowering all Muslim brothers in key positions of the army, police and civil service, apprehending and imprisoning all political activists and trade unions leaders after brutal torturing in long imprisonment s in what was known as (ghost houses. In this change of power the army leaders were forced to align with the revolutionaries (FFC) were part and parcel of the ousted autocratic presidential system. They formed the TMC in accordance with their positions in the hierarchy of the army. Most of them were in the highest security council of the ousted president.
Any change in power by the alignment of the army to a civilian revolution should be dealt with prudently and tactfully by civilian partner (FFC) in our case. The best tactic for the FFC should have been achieving goals by ascending small packages. They should have realized that the military partner ultimate objective is to sustain the inherited presidential system of governance while the FFC objective is a civilian governance through a parliamentary system where the prime minister and his cabint are the real power owners.
So, the first small package could have been a declaration of type of governance in a signed agreement by the two partners. The TMC could have agreed on parliamentary system if and only if they receive in the declaration guarantee that the council of ministers will not cross the following redlines:
1. No intervention by the council of ministers on all affairs pertaining to the armed forces e.g. restructuring, dismissal or deployment in any part of the country.
2. Refraining from taking any decision on the status and deployment of forces in Yemen.
3. No change of the agreed policy to lean to the regional axix of KSA, UAE and Egypt.
The second package is the formation of a supreme council of the state with limited and agreed powers that will not jeopardize the efforts of the council of ministers to run the governance under the slogans of the FFC – Freedom – Peace and Justice -.
The fourth package is the legislative body. The FFC demand is to appoint a legislative council of which they have two thirds of the seat. The TMC is skeptical and alarmed by such a body wich could take decisions tht might directly affect their positions.
The TMC reluctantly and under pressure accepted granting the FFC 67% of the seats. Now the TMC backed-away and pushed the mediators to suspend the formation of the council for 90 days. After 90 days they will still resist the formation.
In my opinion it is only wise and tactful if the FFC drop this issue and accept limited legislations in the transitional period in the form of decres issued y a joint meeting between the supreme council and the council of ministers.
All of the above could be the only way out to avoid a total collapse of the agreement which will directly lead to a coup which nobody knows to where it will lead Sudan.
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